December 29, 2021 by Ray Payne
Does Australia have a fighting chance?
By: Jim Molan
Amid so much talk of war, the key national security question is: Can Australia win the next war? Senator for NSW and retired Major General Jim Molan, AO, DSC, analyses Australia’s national security paradigm amid growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
In one sense, Australia has never been better prepared, given our experience with drought, fires and now COVID. A defence emergency might be easier to handle under federal emergency powers than is a virus under the federation. Of most value is the experience which now reside in our national leaders. They know much better what their powers are and how to use them, and the formation of Home Affairs and how the National Security Committee of Cabinet is being used is significant. But if we think it is difficult to vaccinate our population or conduct quarantine, it is far more difficult to move Australia from a peace time environment to preparation for war and its execution. Regardless of the current emergency, we should be preparing now. Planning costs little.
In our region, war is not just possible, it is becoming more likely. The Prime Minister referred to that in his speech in July 2020, and the situation has deteriorated since then. War is not yet inevitable and what may stop it, or allow us to at least mitigate its impact, is deterrence through preparedness. Alliances are our first line of defence but are only as strong as their individual members. An alliance should never be an excuse for not taking responsibility for national defence and that is the history of alliances since 1945, and I detect a tendency to do that even now. Our defence is primarily our responsibility. We tried relying on alliance promises in 1941 and it did not go well.
Vagaries such as “drums of war” or “a regional threat” are of no use in determining if what we are doing is the right thing, and if we are doing enough. Only by looking at the specific nature of a likely war, will we be able to assess effectively. It is not what we have, but what we can do. This is not a hard line, it is a reasonable line.
We have the best ADF for 50 years. But if we compare it to the tasks which may lie ahead, the ADF demonstrably lacks lethality, sustainability and mass. My deep fear is that if we do not analyse our defence capacity specifically against the likely threat, then we will have a defence force that will literally last only for days in the kind of maritime and air combat that we may face in the next few years. Recent published Defence reports back this view up, as well as my judgement as someone who has run a war.
If this analysis is being conducted behind closed doors, there is no sign that the likely results are being acted on and which should be visible to all. What we have learned from published reports is not comforting. It is the people’s national security that is at stake, and the people’s money which is being spent. Most Australian would think that the $270 billion promised by the PM over the next 10 years buys defence perfection, but this must be tested to the people’s satisfaction, not just in some wargaming room somewhere. If the news is embarrassingly not good, that is, Australia is not prepared, that will not be a surprise to our likely adversaries, China and Russia, who will know more about our defence preparedness than 99.9 per cent of Australians.
Recently China has adopted a much more aggressive stance and along with Russia, they consider the liberal democracies to be the “decadent and decaying West”. China has directed grey-zone conflict vectors (trade, cyber, diplomacy, theft of IP, influence operations) directly against Australia and our allies, and has built up its military to an extraordinary extent, along with threats to use it directly against this and other nations. Current grey-zone conflict could be easily enhanced by China to include unattributable biological and cyber attacks, trade sanctions almost amounting to a blockade and the use of organisations such as the Maritime Militia against our near neighbours.
Even more worrying, the US has a severely decreased military capability, by my rough estimate, 30-50 per cent less capable than it was at the end of the Cold War (1991) when our belief in infinite US power was created. The consequence is that the US cannot come to the aid of all its allies in the way that it once could, even if it wanted to. The commentary in the US indicates there is little confidence that the US can deter or ‘win’ a Taiwan scenario war against China. The US could either decide, with immense strategic consequences, not to stand up to an aggressive China, or suffers a military defeat and is forced out of the region. For Australia, the results are much the same – we are likely to be on our own. A reliance on the presence of the US Marines in the Northern Territory as part of our defence is fanciful. The whole reason-for-being of that force is once tension increases, Marines get in their ships and sail away. They should never be an excuse for not being responsible for our own defence.
It is only prudent that Australia plans for at least three scenario: grey-zone conflict being enhanced; a war between the US and China from which we may be attacked collaterally; and a war that forces the US out of the region, leaving us on our own for what might then occur. Then once comprehensive planning has occurred, we should decide how much risk we are prepared to accept. As president Dwight Eisenhower said: “The value is not in the plans, but it is in the planning”. National security has changed remarkably while we were handling drought, fires and COVID. As the undisputed government of national security, we must do the serious hard yards now, and talk to the people. Once we start looking at the detail of likely threats, and what our strengths and weaknesses are, perhaps we can even define ‘winning’.
Jim Molan is a senator for NSW. He retired as a major general from the Australian Army in 2008. He sadly passed away in early 2023.
AUSTRALIAN BORDER FORCE
Maritime Border Command
Maritime Border Command (MBC) is enabled by Australian Border Force (ABF) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF). It supports the whole of government effort to protect Australia’s
Protect our offshore areas
Australia has 37,000 kilometres of coastline and an offshore maritime area of almost 45.1 million square kilometres. This means MBC’s area of interest is equal to around eleven per cent of the Earth’s surface.
Our vessels and aircraft undertake patrols as part of our surveillance and response activities. This supports the whole-of-government approach to civil maritime security threats in Australia’s maritime domain.
Australian Border Force Cutter (ABFC) Ocean Shield
The ABFC Ocean Shield is the largest ship in the Australian Border Force fleet.
It is a multi-role ship that can respond to a wide range of civil maritime security threats. It is available for operations 300 days of the year. It can operate in northern waters and the Southern Ocean.
Southern Ocean patrols are part of our commitment to intercepting vessels and apprehending people suspected of illegally fishing in the ecologically fragile sub-Antarctic waters.
Specifications
- length: 110.9 metres
- beam: 22 metres
- displacement tonnage: 8,363
Accommodation
- cabin accommodation for a total of 78
- austere accommodation for transportees
Facilities, equipment and weapons
- an emergency surgical, care and resuscitation room, staffed by a doctor
- an operations room equipped with secure communications
- a forward-looking infra-red detection system
- two deck-mounted 0.50 calibre general purpose machine guns
- Glock pistols for ABF boarding party officers
- other personal defence equipment
Specifications of the ship’s two boats
- 8.5m Norsafe SOLAS approved boats
- powered by twin 300hp diesel jet propulsion
- with a range of approximately 120 nautical miles at 20 knots
Australian Border Force Cutter (ABFC) Thaiyak
The ABFC Thaiyak (pronounced ‘tie-yak’) operates at the reef for 300 days per year. The ABFC Thaiyak allows us to conduct enforcement operations. It also enables us to assist with environmental management.
The ship can carry up to 17 ABF officers and government officials. It can also carry up to 24 transportees.
We chose the name ‘Thaiyak’ from suggestions by Torres Strait Islander crew members in consultation with their elders. Many of the fleet Marine Unit officers are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
Specifications
- length: 40 m
- beam: 11.5 m
- gross tonnage: 585
- max speed: 12 knots
Facilities, equipment and weapons
- first aid/isolation facility
- operations room
- Glock pistols for ABF boarding party officers
- other personal defence equipment
- Two Norsafe 750 ship’s boats
Cape Class patrol boats
The Cape Class patrol boats (CCPB) and crew can operate to the edge of the Exclusive Economic Zone.
The Cape Class patrol boat fleet replaced most of the Bay Class vessels in 2015 as they have greater range, endurance and flexibility.
These boats have enhanced capability to operate in higher seas and can survive in more severe conditions.
The Cape Class patrol boats can:
- undertake 28-day patrols
- sail 4,000 nautical miles before having to refuel
- sail to the 50 degrees south mark, in the Southern Ocean equatorial waters
- combat the full range of civil maritime security threats
- carry a crew of 18-20 officers
- identify, track, intercept an extended range of threats in the maritime domain
- gather intelligence and store evidence for matters that may proceed to the courts
- launch two response vessels simultaneously
We named these boats after some of the furthest extremities of the Australia. The names highlight the scope of the ABF’s operational areas and the amount of work needed to protect our borders.
Each boat’s name reflects geographical capes in each Australian state and territory:
- Cape St George (ACT)
- Cape Byron (NSW)
- Cape Nelson (Victoria)
- Cape Sorell (Tasmania)
- Cape Jervis (SA)
- Cape Leveque (WA)
- Cape Wessel (NT)
- Cape York (Queensland)
Specifications
- length: 57.8m
- sea range: 4,000 nautical miles
- twin 2,600 kilowatt Caterpillar engines with reversing gearbox
- life of vessel: 20 years
Facilities, equipment and weapons
- two deck-mounted 0.50 calibre general purpose machine guns
- holding areas equipped with closed-circuit television and facilities
- weapons and personal defensive equipment
- Glock pistols for ABF’s boarding party officers
- two Norsafe 7.3m Ship’s Boats
Bottom of Form
These boats are named after some of the furthest extremities of Australian waters. The names highlight the scope of the ABF’s operational areas and the amount of work needed to protect our borders.
Each boat’s name reflects geographical capes in each Australian state and territory:
- Cape St George (ACT)
- Cape Byron (NSW)
- Cape Nelson (Victoria)
- Cape Sorell (Tasmania)
- Cape Jervis (SA)
- Cape Leveque (WA)
- Cape Wessel (NT)
- Cape York (Queensland)
Specifications
- length: 57.8m
- sea range: 4,000 nautical miles
- twin 2,600 kilowatt Caterpillar engines with reversing gearbox
- life of vessel: 20 years
Facilities, equipment and weapons
- two deck-mounted 0.50 calibre general purpose machine guns
- holding areas equipped with closed-circuit television and facilities
- weapons and personal defensive equipment
- Glock pistols for ABF’s boarding party officers
- two Norsafe 7.3m Ship’s Boats
AUSTRALIAN BORDER FORCE – needs at least three (3) times this inventory
——————————————————————————————
Skippers shocked by influx of Indonesian fishing boats in protected waters close to Australian mainland
ABC Kimberley
/
Erin Parke
Posted Thu 14 Oct 2021 at 3:39amThursday 14 Oct 2021 at 3:39am, updated Thu 14 Oct 2021 at 3:41am
Ross Newton has been running boat charters in the area for more than 30 years.
He says he is worried the influx of illegal fishers has occurred because authorities are no longer boarding boats to due COVID-19.
Witnesses say the Indonesian fishermen seemed relaxed and happy to be photographed, despite being in the area illegally. (Supplied: Harley Cuzens)
“I’ve never seen an Indonesian boat there before, but on this last trip we saw seven individual foreign vessels, which is very worrying,” he said.
“They were out there walking all over the reef and collecting what they could – all within sanctuary zones at one of the most pristine dive sites and wilderness areas in the world.
“We’re not sure if it’s because of COVID, that the authorities aren’t boarding them and sending the back like they normally would.”
The witnesses interviewed by ABC are all licensed to operate in the area.
Fishing is prohibited in the Rowley Shoals Marine Park but a small number of charter boats take tourists diving and snorkelling in the area.
Skipper Harley Cuzens also visited the area in early October and said he was shocked by number of Indonesian men brazenly collecting seafood.
Skipper Harley Cuzens says he was shocked by the number of Indonesian boats off the Kimberley coast.(ABC Kimberley: Erin Parke)
“I actually left the Rowley Shoals in a hurry because I was very worried about piracy,” he said.
“It was concerning knowing full well that we weren’t armed, had no protection and these guys were running rampant around our border security.
“These are people that are desperate and I feel sorry for them, but they’re making a mockery of our border security, coming and going at leisure with no one to stop them.”
Six ways Australia can get real about boosting our defence forces
By Peter Jennings August 7, 2022
The Albanese government’s announcement of a new defence strategic review, to be led by former defence minister Stephen Smith and former chief of defence force Sir Angus Houston, comes not a minute too soon to deal with the darkening strategic environment. It does not matter that the review is to look to “2032-33 and beyond” – the real challenge is to see what can be done to deter or prevail in an Indo-Pacific conflict with China in perhaps three to five years.
Why a war in the mid-2020s? That’s the period when many strategic analysts across the West’s national security establishment believe the People’s Liberation Army will be at its strongest relative to its opponents, when the democracies will be at their distracted nadir, and Xi Jinping will be at the zenith of his personal power in his mid-70s.
Xi sees himself as a world historical figure taking advantage of America’s terminal decline to realise the great China dream of global dominance. He is not going to step away from power – or, more likely, have power taken from him – wondering if he could have forcefully put Taiwan under Communist Party control.
Forget the AUKUS promise of nuclear-powered submarines to be delivered in the later 2030s. By then the Chinese Communist Party will be a relic of history or dictating to the Indo-Pacific.
For several years now Australia has been the sand in Beijing’s gears, showing the world that appeasement, or “nuanced diplomacy” as its advocates call it, is not the solution. Working with like-minded allies, building strong military capabilities and giving our Southeast Asian and Pacific Island neighbours better options for co-operation will deter China.
Smith and Houston have a bare eight months to come up with a better plan for Defence than the fantasy of a “networked and integrated future force” in the 2040s, something never to be taken out of its limited-edition box.
The “future force” strategic plan worked well enough when the wars Australia faced were optional deployments to the Middle East. Anthony Albanese – like Scott Morrison before him – needs to respond to a much harder Indo-Pacific strategic reality. On that, Australia is out of time.
Our planners no longer have a notional 10 years to identify a threat and gear up to defeat it. China already has the capability to project substantial power into our nearer region, to target Australian military bases and critical infrastructure with missiles, and to coerce our neighbours.
It’s not surprising that Houston said at Wednesday’s launch: “It’s absolutely imperative that we review the current strategic circumstances, which I rate the worst I have ever seen in my career and lifetime.”
No one should be surprised. For the better part of a decade I have been writing in The Australian and elsewhere about the strategic threat presented by Beijing. I have been called a hawk, a xenophobe, a “national security cowboy”, a shill for the military-industrial complex and worse.
There will be time enough to explore how it was that so many people could pretend, for so long, that Beijing was benign or that the risk could be managed. Right now, the challenge is to rethink defence policy dramatically.
For Smith and Houston, I suggest there are six policy priorities that should guide their work. They are: adding to defence firepower; stockpiling essential equipment; speeding decision-making; increasing the US military presence; hardening and dispersing bases; and, finally, strengthening our national resilience.
At land, sea and in the air, Defence simply lacks enough weapons with the long ranges needed to prevail in modern war. For decades we put priority on buying the ships, aircraft and vehicles “fitted for but not with” armaments.
Old habits die hard; the Coalition’s last budget cancelled the SkyGuardian MQ-9B armed drone just on the point of delivery. A near-identical weapon killed al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri last week, showing the value of long-range drones able to stay airborne for up to 24 hours.
Nothing in the Australian Defence Force can deliver that outcome without putting pilots’ lives at risk. Enemy drones will push our crewed ships and aircraft out of combat range.
Australia needs to acquire these and similar weapons available now from current US and European production runs. We can’t wait for a domestic industry to be built over a decade but we do need an industry capable of maintaining, upgrading, storing and distributing these weapons.
On stockpiling, the lesson of the Ukraine war is that missiles will be depleted very quickly, so they need to be bought in sufficient numbers they can be stockpiled and used in large numbers across prolonged conflict. Defence used to buy small numbers of missiles for training purposes, but we have no serious “war stocks” to speak of. When the missiles run out it doesn’t matter how advanced the launch vehicle is.
Governments have been frustrated for decades over the slowness of Defence decision-making. It’s not that officials are lazy; it’s more that the system is designed around peacetime priorities to reduce risk, weigh options and deliver modest successes.
Smith and Houston need to propose an emergency weapons procurement agency, something that will accept the reality of the strategic judgment that a mid-decade war is a real possibility. This step alone will overturn decades of rusted-on Defence processes. The test is simple: buy only what can be delivered in three to five years.
The fourth priority is to work with the US to increase its military presence, particularly in northern Australia. Smith was defence minister and Houston was chief of defence force when the US Marine Corps and greater US Air Force presence in the north was negotiated. They understand the deterrent value of that American military presence.
In the event of a military crisis in the Indo-Pacific, American policy is to disperse their forces to complicate enemy targeting. For Australia that means we urgently need to think about how we deal with that situation. The good news is that we are not alone. The “force posture” Smith and Houston need to consider is an allied force posture, but a larger US presence will draw heavily on Australia’s limited northern infrastructure. What can we do to make the north better able to handle a substantial growth in military forces there? Hardening and dispersing bases and areas from which the ADF and allied forces may operate is another critical task.
For years the policy priority was to create fewer, larger bases. Often near population centres, these large bases are barely protected against protesters, let along a determined foreign adversary. There is a huge task ahead to determine how to strengthen these facilities and to plan for dispersing our own forces (not just in Australia) at a time of crisis.
Finally, there is the issue of national resilience. We have grown used to the ADF being the national “go-to” resource in dealing with fires, floods and pandemics. Shortly before or during conflict the onus will be reversed: the military will look to industry and the Australian population to support a bigger defence effort. Smith and Houston need to start that conversation with the Australian people.
It is not often realised or reported but there is no more urgent policy agenda before the Albanese government than this new strategic review. It’s time to accept the truth about our worsening strategic position and start defence planning as though the threat was real – because it most assuredly is.
Peter Jennings is the former executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and a former deputy secretary for strategy at the Defence Department
China growth target ‘will not be easy’ to make: new premier
Li Qiang holds his first press conference as premier at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People on Monday. Picture: Getty Images
China’s new Premier warned on Monday that the country’s 5 per cent growth target for this year would not be “easy” to achieve, as its rubber-stamp parliament wrapped up over a week of meetings.
The government set the economic growth target of “around 5 per cent” last week, one of the lowest in decades as China emerged from strict zero-Covid rules that dragged on its GDP.
And Li Qiang – one of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s most trusted allies, confirmed as Premier over the weekend – admitted that goal would be hard to attain. “I’m afraid that reaching our growth target of around 5 per cent will be no easy task, and will require that we redouble our efforts,” Mr Li said at a press conference in Beijing held to mark the closing of the National People’s Congress.
China posted just 3 per cent growth last year, missing its stated target of around 5.5 per cent by a wide margin as the economy strained under the impact of strict Covid policies and a property crisis.
Mr Li, who replaced Li Keqiang, said on Monday that the modest figure “has been determined after a comprehensive consideration of various factors”.
He warned of “many new challenges” to growth, but added that most people “don’t fix their sights every day” on the country’s economic indicators. Instead, he said, they care more about “specific issues close to them” such as housing, employment, income, education and health.
China’s housing market, which along with construction accounts for more than a quarter of GDP, remains in a slump, having been dealt a hefty blow since Beijing started cracking down on excessive borrowing and rampant speculation in 2020.
Mr Li also hit out at the US, with relations at lows not seen in decades as the powers grapple over trade, technology and security. “Encirclement and suppression are not advantageous for anyone,” Mr Li said. “China and the United States should co-operate, and must co-operate. When China and the US work together, there is much we can achieve.”
Mr Li’s comments cap more than a week of high-level meetings in Beijing. Mr Xi, addressing the closing session of China’s congress in his first address since being handed a third term – and further cementing his position as China’s most powerful leader in generations – emphasised the need to strengthen national security. He thanked the thousands of delegates at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People for giving him a third term, vowing to “take the needs of the country as my mission, and the interests of the people as my yardstick”.
“Security is the bedrock of development, while stability is a prerequisite for prosperity,” Mr Xi said. “We must fully promote the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces, and build the people’s armed forces into a Great Wall of steel that effectively safeguards national sovereignty, security and development interests.”
He also called for consolidated stability in once-restive Hong Kong and unification with the self-ruled island of Taiwan, which China considers its territory.
“The trust of the people is the greatest driving force pushing me forward, and also a heavy responsibility on my shoulders,” he said.
“The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered an irreversible historical process.”
On other appointments, General Li Shangfu, who was sanctioned by the US government in 2018 for buying Russian weapons, was named Defence Minister.
The congress also confirmed key allies of Mr Xi to its cabinet, including top aide Ding Xuexiang and He Lifeng, a long-time colleague of Mr Xi. They were both elected to vice-premier positions.
Mr Ding and Mr He received almost all votes from more than 2900 members of the congress, with former mayor of Tianjin Zhang Guoqing as well as former Shaanxi province party secretary Liu Guozhong also selected as vice-premiers.
On Sunday, the cabinet surprisingly retained its country’s central bank chief, Yi Gang, against expectations that retirement-age Yi would step down.
Commerce Minister Wang Wentao and Finance Minister Liu Kun were also retained.
AFP
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has reshaped AUKUS, regional power and Labor
SIMON BENSON
Anthony Albanese, left, Joe Biden and Rishi Sunak at Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego, California, on Tuesday. Picture: Getty Images
Anthony Albanese and his Defence Minister, Richard Marles, have delivered a national defence outcome that not so long ago would have been unthinkable for Labor.
They would argue its fidelity with Labor tradition, from Andrew Fisher’s creation of the navy and John Curtin’s call to arms in World War II to a unified defence department under Gough Whitlam.
But AUKUS by its definition should be an abhorrence to the predominant elements of the modern Labor left.
Of the things they find most morally detestable, US military hegemony and nuclear power rank near the top of the list.
Yet it is a Labor government led by the left’s most senior member that is now doing both; buying US-made nuclear submarines.
Anthony Albanese has done well on the world stage, projecting strength and relevance. Picture: AFP
It’s hard to imagine any Labor leader of recent times getting away with it. Shorten, Gillard, Rudd – even Hawke.
Bearing in mind it’s equally difficult to see a Labor government having ever initiated such a project had it not been for the Morrison-led Coalition bequeathing it.
Others will see it as Albanese being boxed in, both by Defence and his predecessor. Politically, he could not have not gone ahead with it.
That said, the Prime Minister has sought to put his personal stamp on AUKUS, rewriting Labor’s previously damaged national defence credentials and, in the process, restoring the primacy of traditional pro-alliance right-wing Labor principles.
This is where Marles was instrumental to the outcome, having guided the government through the process both internally and externally with his US and UK counterparts.
He is right in his acknowledgement that the geopolitical significance of the new tripartite defence pact, the transformation of Australia’s own projection of regional power and the reshaping of the nation’s defence architecture can’t be overstated.
Equally the Defence Minister’s role in buttressing Albanese’s ability to keep faith with the mission should not be underestimated.
The fact this has not caused a ripple in the fabric of Labor unity on the issue says two things. China has changed the equation, even for the left.
It also represents a modernised values-based appeal that enables a pragmatic delivery of outcomes, even if some within Labor remain squeamish.
There is no question Albanese has done well on the world stage, projecting strength and relevance.
Marles, at the same time, has been the steward of what has been one of the most complex but game-changing alliances forged in more than 70 years.
This signals an evolution in Labor leadership. Albanese maintaining authority over his caucus, with Marles massaging the concerns.
Anthony Albanese, left, Joe Biden and Rishi Sunak after a trilateral meeting during the AUKUS summit in San Diego, California, on Tuesday. Picture: Getty Images
As John Howard did with the Liberal Party, Albanese has allowed the party to run while still maintaining control, often shifting people into positions they never would have contemplated.
What he and Marles have delivered is without post-war precedent for Labor, both in its scope but also when considering the degree of perceived internal difficulty.
Those in the left who may once have been considered hostile are now deeply entrenched – witness left powerbroker Pat Conroy as Defence Industry Minister.
Albanese has also manoeuvred Labor deep into Coalition territory on defence, challenging the notion of Coalition brand advantage without any discomfort while washing away the stain of Labor’s last term in office when its credibility on defence and national security was gravely damaged.
The broader domestic political dividends, however, are mixed.
Joe Biden, right, and Anthony Albanese at Naval Base Point Loma in San Diego, California, on Tuesday. Picture: Getty Images
There is rarely any political prize for a government doing what voters think it ought to be doing – keeping the country safe.
Albanese, however, is cleverly weaving the nuclear submarine deal and questions of manufacturing sovereignty into a broader Labor nation-building narrative, in the same vein as Chifley’s first Australian-built FX Holden.
Not that Albanese will be around to oversee the first Australian-made submarine roll out of the Adelaide shipyards.
AUKUS will now be an enduring and unshakable bipartisan policy, a rarity in modern Australian politics, which will be inherited by future Labor governments as well as Coalition ones, each delivering on various milestones.
The test for Albanese now lies with his ability to sell the announcement domestically considering the eye-watering cost of $368bn. At a time of uncertainty and cost-of-living pressures, this won’t be easy to reconcile among those who have been forced into household austerity.
The opposition, while offering bipartisan support to a policy of its own design, will be arguing that the cost of the program can’t be used as an excuse to raise taxes.
Former White House chief of staff Mick Mulvaney says even the “left-leaning” Albanese government identifying…
Simon Benson
Political Editor
Award-winning journalist Simon Benson is The Australian’s Political Editor. He was previously National Affairs Editor, the Daily Telegraph’s NSW political editor, and also president of the NSW Parliamentary Press.
How the AUKUS submarines will work, armed with Tomahawk missiles and able to evade China
United States Navy Virginia Class submarine USS Mississippi arrives at Fleet Base West, Rockingham, Western Australia for a routine port visit.
- By BEN PACKHAM
Foreign Affairs and Defence Correspondent
@bennpackham
Australia will operate three of the quietest, longest-range submarines available by the late 2030s, armed with Tomahawk missiles that can hit land or maritime targets from at least 1500 km.
The Virginia-class subs and subsequent AUKUS-class boats will be able to lurk quietly off China’s main submarine base at Hainan Island, or near key choke points in the East and South China Seas, able to intercept Chinese subs and surface ships or launch strikes on the Chinese mainland.
Australia has never before possessed such a capability. As Richard Marles says, it will place an additional “question mark” into the strategic calculations of potential adversaries, by which he means China.
It’s no coincidence that China’s President Xi Jinping pre-empted the official AUKUS announcement by vowing to build the People’s Liberation Army into a “great wall of steel”.
But as Australia will initially operate subs from the current US fleet, there won’t be a net increase in the Western allies’ nuclear-powered submarine capability until the first AUKUS-built boats roll off the production line. For Australia, that will happen in about 2042, while the first British-built AUKUS boat is scheduled for completion before the end of the 2030s.
The Virginia-class subs will come equipped with 12 vertical launch cells and four torpedo tubes each. They are 7925 tonne monsters that can travel at speeds of more than 25 knots (46 km/h) – about three times as fast as Australia’s Collins-class boats.
The exact specifications of the AUKUS-class boats aren’t known, but they will be armed with long-range missiles and torpedoes.
At the heart of the boats will be US-designed combat systems and similar reactors to American subs, making them interoperable with future US boats.
Australia will get the first of the US-made subs from the early 2030s, according to the AUKUS schedule, mitigating a feared “capability gap” from the retirement of Australia’s Collins-class boats from 2038.
The procurement is the largest and most complex in Australia’s history, and will deliver the ADF’s biggest capability leap since the Second World War.
Mr Marles said the decision was made amid “a very significant military build-up within our region” – a clear reference to China, which the Albanese government is simultaneously trying to normalise relations with.
“We need to respond to this. Failure to do so would see us be condemned by history,” the Defence Minister said.
“As a trading nation, so much harm can be done to us before ever setting foot upon our shores”, Mr Marles said.
“And so it’s fundamentally important for our nation that we have the ability to project, and to project with impact.
“And a long-range nuclear powered, capable submarine, will be at the heart of Australia’s future projection. It will enable us to hold adversaries of risk further from our shores.
“But the true intent of this submarine of this capability is to provide for the peace and stability of our region.”
Unlike Australia’s Collins subs, nuclear submarines don’t have to come to the surface to “snort” – the term used for the need for conventional submarines to periodically run their diesel engines so they can charge their electric batteries.
Nuclear submarines’ ability to remain covertly submerged depends only on their supplies of food, water and air.
They also posses an effectively unlimited power source, giving them greater range and endurance and providing crew members with greater comforts such as hot water.
Standing alongside Anthony Albanese in San Diego, Joe Biden made the point that Australia would not receive nuclear armed submarines.
But Australia has shifted even closer to its nuclear-armed partners, the US and UK.
Australia will gain the ability to put adversaries at risk from greater distances, but will face an even greater prospect of being drawn into a Western conflict with China over Taiwan.
Ben Packham
Foreign Affairs and Defence Correspondent
Ben Packham has spent two decades in journalism, joining The Australian as a political reporter in 2011 after working at the Herald Sun and AAP. He rejoined the Canberra bureau in 2018 after four years in Papua New Guinea.
China warns AUKUS has made Australia a target for the People’s Liberation Army
China has warned about the fallout of the AUKUS pact. Picture: AFP
- By Will Glasgow
North Asia Correspondent
Chinese experts have warned that Australia has put itself on the People Liberation Army’s “defence radar” as Beijing accused Canberra of stoking an “arms race” with its $368bn plan to build nuclear powered submarines with the United States and United Kingdom.
China’s Foreign Ministry said the AUKUS partnership was “typical Cold War mentality” that would stoke “an arms race” and undermine the international non-proliferation system, in Beijing’s first official comments after the mammoth defence acquisition was announced.
“Peace-loving countries have expressed serious concern and firm opposition to the damage to regional peace and stability,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said on Tuesday evening.
The Chinese government official said Australia, the US and the UK had gone “further and further down the wrong and dangerous road for their own geopolitical self-interest”.
Mr Wang also accused Canberra, Washington and London of engaging in “deception” to “coerce” the International Atomic Energy Agency to allow the deal, and signalled Beijing would continue its already 18-month long campaign to block the transfer of nuclear submarine technology.
Chinese government-linked academics and military officials said Australia’s mammoth defence acquisition was putting the country on the “frontline” of America and China’s strategic competition, which they said would worsen Canberra’s already strained relationship with its biggest trading partner.
China currently has 78 submarine fleets with Australia behind at six, however this is subject to change after the…
Chen Hong, president of the Chinese Association of Australian Studies and director of the Australian Studies Centre at East China Normal University, said the AUKUS arrangement was a “time bomb”.
“Continuing promoting the alliance means that Australia will officially put itself on Beijing’s defence radar,” Professor Chen told China’s nationalistic tabloid the Global Times.
Chinese military expert Song Zhongping told the party-state masthead that Australia had become a “de facto offshoot of the US nuclear submarine fleet”, which elevated risks for Australian forces.
Taiwan welcomed the submarine deal, which senior members of President Tsai Ing-wen’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party said would help redress the “military imbalance” across the Taiwan Strait.
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is happy to see and welcomes the continued advancement of the AUKUS partnership,” a spokesman for Taiwan’s government said in a statement.
“As an important member of the Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan is located at the hub of the first island chain and at the forefront of the fight against authoritarian expansion.
“Taiwan will continue to co-operate with like-minded countries inside and outside the region, and strive to maintain the rules-based international order and safeguard regional peace, stability and prosperity.”
The Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s main opposition party, also welcomed the submarine acquisition.
“We would like to see a stronger Western alliance in terms of military capability and technology,” said the KMT’s top international adviser Alexander Huang.
However, Professor Huang cautioned that the submarines, while helpful in the medium term, would not be in operation for more than 10 years.
“The changing dynamic that we are concerned about today is more near term,” he told The Australian.
Zhou Bo, a retired Senior Colonel of the People’s Liberation Army, said that eight nuclear powered submarines would complicate Beijing’s military planning.
“It will certainly make decision making in Beijing more complicated. But I would say China is strong enough or confident enough not to take these as game changers,” he told The Australian.
Mr Zhou, a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, said the submarine project would put Canberra in a “very difficult situation” as China and America’s strategic competition increases.
“I think the Australian government will find itself more and more sandwiched in the future,” he said.
The ambitious project to acquire world-leading nuclear submarine capability is a key plank in the response by America and its allies to the massive build-up of the capabilities of China’s People’s Liberation Army over the past decade. Beijing last week further ramped up military spending by more than 7 per cent to more than $330bn.
China’s diplomatic support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and heightened military activity around Taiwan has raised concerns about its intentions towards the island, which the Communist Party considers a rogue province.
There was no change to China’s Taiwan policy announced during the National People’s Congress, the country’s most important annual political meeting, which finished on Monday.
Mr Zhou, the retired PLA Senior Colonel, said there was a widespread misconception about Beijing’s intentions towards the self-governed island.
“First of all, China has never announced a timetable for reunification with Taiwan,” he said.
“Second, it is in our own best interest to have peaceful reunification with Taiwan, because what is the use of a Taiwan that is totally shattered?”
But he warned that the international community needed to beware of Beijing’s red lines. “Do not let mainland China believe that there is no more chance for peaceful reunification.”
Will Glasgow
North Asia Correspondent
Will Glasgow is The Australian’s North Asia Correspondent. In 2018 he won the Keith McDonald Award for Business Journalist of the Year. He previously worked at The Australian Financial Review.